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On July 26, 2018, thousands of protesters, led by the Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo,
marched in Argentina to oppose President Mauricio Macri's plans to empower the
military to engage in domestic policing. In a country where a military regime killed
thousands of civilians between 1976 and 1983, the prospect of the military on the
streets again has opened old wounds and incited a heated debate. Macri defended the
change, which was implemented by two executive decrees, as being necessary to
enable Argentina to face the security challenges of the 21st century, including drug
trafficking and terrorism.
The move is not a surprise. Diminished in size, underpaid, and without a clear role in
society, the Argentine military has grown disgruntled in recent years. Macri campaigned
on a promise to improve conditions for the armed forces, and has already implemented
a 20 percent salary increase in an effort to close the gap in pay between the military, the
police, and gendarmerie, while the military has welcomed the proposed expansion of its
role. Traditionally the military is responsible for fighting wars and responding to external
threats, the police for policing civilian populations, and the gendarmerie for border
enforcement. These distinctions, however, are growing blurred.
The developments in Argentina are just part of the frightening trend of expanding
military power across
Latin America. Persistent security challenges, such as gang violence and drug
trafficking, are so extensive and so transnational in nature that police forces are having
difficulty coping. Mounting public pressure for results in combating these problems has
led elected civilian governments to turn to their militaries, despite the dangers of
empowering the armed forces with internally-focused duties.
The shadow of the military dictatorships across Latin America in the 20th century
should inform today's political leaders. Especially during the Cold War, militaries

routinely acted as the ultimate decision-makers in national politics who overthrew
governments, suppressed political activity, and committed widespread human rights
abuses. These regimes relied on violent repression to maintain power, including
coordinating their use of state terror through Operation Condor, the multinational secret
alliance among military dictatorships in South America.
Rushing to empower militaries today breaks down hard- won safeguards against
repeating the abuses of the past. This has opened a Pandora's box, and quietly but
steadily the military has grown larger and more sophisticated, broadened its mission,
and gained significant political influence. Today, the military enjoys a position of power
in the region not seen since the Cold War, with dangerous implications for human rights
and democracy.
Growth and Domestic Policing
When new democratic governments came to power in the wake of the Cold War,
military political influence was significantly curtailed. Responding to the recent atrocities
committed by the military, the new governments radically reduced the militaries in size,
slashed their budgets, and subjected them to increased civilian oversight. Facing few
external threats and with internal security now handled by civilian police, most militaries
became a shell of their former selves. In addition, civilian governments revoked many of
the amnesties passed as part of democratic transitions, opening the possibility of trying
and imprisoning members of the military for past human rights abuses.
In the last two decades, however, successes in reining in military power have been
reversed. Latin America's militaries have steadily grown to levels not seen since the
1980 s. The militaries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras have grown by more
than 20 percent since their post-Cold War lows. The Brazilian, Bolivian, Mexican, and
Venezuelan militaries have at least doubled in size. Colombia's military has quadrupled,
from 175,000 troops in 1990 to 336,000 today. The rest of the region's militaries have
grown in size by an average of 35 percent. At the same time, they have acquired more
sophisticated weaponry and become increasingly specialized, with most countries
maintaining an array of special forces units trained by the United States.
A widespread increase in crime, gang violence, and drug trafficking has in part
driven this growth. In an attempt to stem the flow of illegal arms and drugs, countries
have heavily militarized their borders and regularly conduct joint military operations with
neighboring countries. Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay work together to police the triborder region [explored in more detail throughout this issue.] Peru and Bolivia closely
cooperate to combat narcotrafficking. In March, a newly-formed dissident faction of the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) rebel group kidnapped and later killed

three Ecuadorian journalists, prompting the Ecuadorian government to send 10,000
troops to the border.
While labeled as border operations, these practices often begin well before one
reaches the border, effectively providing militaries with policing powers over large
swaths of their countries and bringing them into regular contact with civilians. In
January, for example, Brazil activated the new 22nd Jungle Infantry Brigade to protect its
northern border with Guyana, French Guiana, and Suriname. But the force also has
jurisdiction over the entire states of Maranhão, Amapá, and large parts of Pará near the
coast. In many other countries, including the United States, military border patrols also
extend far into the interior.
Targeting areas of drug cultivation also grants the military control over large rural
areas. Following the recent peace agreement with the FARC, ending a half-century of
civil war, Colombia's military is being retooled and redeployed to intensify its fight
against drug traffickers, including the Gulf Clan cartel, which has grown significantly in
strength. In January 2018, the government deployed the 9,000-troop Hercules task
force, the largest military unit activated in two decades, to the department of Nariño,
where the majority of the country's coca is grown.
Similarly, for Peru, persistent problems such as narcotrafficking and combating
remnants of the Shining Path insurgency have renewed the military's internal security
mission. The military's primary duty is external security, but it also has a domestic role,
especially in the Valley of the Apurimac, Ene, and Montero Rivers (VRAEM) emergency
zone, where the military, not the civilian Peruvian National Police (PNP) are responsible
for security.
Military presence in urban environments in Latin America is also expanding. As
regular police forces find themselves outgunned by well-organized gangs and drug
syndicates, the military has displaced the police in internal security. The mandate of the
military, however, is to fight enemies of the state through applying violence, not to
protect and serve civilian populations, a mandate of policing. For example, military
personnel played a lead role in Brazil's “pacification” policy in the favelas of Rio de
Janeiro in 2008, and military presence expanded further when the country hosted the
2014
World Cup and 2016 Olympic Games. The establishment of a Ministry for Public
Security in February 2018, led by an army general, has further institutionalized the
military's mission in day-to-day policing. That same month, the government also
authorized a federal intervention in Rio de Jainero, and over 4,000 members of the
military now operate in the city.
Jair Bolsonaro, the controversial new president, boasts rhetoric that extols the use of
unrestrained force in the fight against street crime. In his first week of office alone,
Bolsonaro appointed six active or former members of the military to his cabinet, giving

the institution more political influence than it has had since it governed the country in the
1980 s. In January, he deployed troops to Fortaleza and ten other cities across the state
of Caerá in response to a rise in gang violence.
Meanwhile, in Mexico, then-President Felipe Calderón first deployed the military to
fight drug gangs in 2006, and it now operates in 27 of Mexico's 32 states. The 2017 Law
on Internal Security strengthened the military's role in policing, going so far as to
“subordinate civilian law enforcement operations to military authority in some instances.”
Under this law, the military was granted new powers, including the ability to conduct its
own investigations. It also classified information on military operations, thereby
restricting civilian oversight. In November 2018, the Supreme Court ruled this law to be
unconstitutional on the grounds that it was too ambiguous in defining the appropriate
use of force. Mexico's internal security questions will continue dominating the political
debate as the new president, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), finds his footing
in office. The Supreme Court ruling came just hours after he announced his own
security plan, which looked very similar to that of the outgoing administration, with army
and navy personnel deployed in policing duties across the country.
Using the military for domestic policing carries significant risks. As highly lethal and
insular forces, militaries are more likely to use deadly force and operate with little
oversight. Nowhere is this more visible than in the Northern Triangle of El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras, which have some of the highest crime and murder rates in
the world. The region's largest gangs—the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Barrio 18—
are estimated to have as many as 85,000 members combined. In response, countries
have militarized the problem. In 2016, El Salvador created a new military task force,
equipped with helicopters and assault weapons, to f ight criminal gangs. In 2018, an
investigation revealed that senior members of the Salvadoran military were operating a
secret death squad to execute suspected gang members, raising the ghosts of military
abuses during the country's civil war.
Public Pressure and Civilian Empowerment
In contrast to much of the military behavior of the 20th century that Latin American
countries have sought to put behind them, in this new era of remilitarization, it is often
democratically-elected leaders themselves who are looking to the military for solutions
to intractable national problems, often at the behest of the civilian population.
As countries democratized in the 1980 s, citizens had high expectations that quality
of life would improve under democracy, but many elected governments performed
poorly in the ensuing years. Neoliberal economic policies have led to increased
inequality and poverty, while corruption is rampant and many citizens fear for their
safety. The majority of respondents across the region feel that their country is “governed

for the benefit of the powerful” and disapprove of how the government of the day is
running their countries, according to a 2017 survey by the polling organization
Latinobarómetro. Asked to identify the most important problem facing their country,
crime tops the list for almost every country, with unemployment and corruption typically
close behind. In El Salvador, over half of respondents said they are concerned about
being a victim of a violent crime all or almost all of the time. In Brazil, that figure is 68%.
Civilian politicians must respond to public demand if they are to stay in office, and
failures in performance imperil democracy itself. In an environment of high crime rates,
gang violence, and poor public security, citizens may be ready to defect from
democracy entirely. Latinobarómetro consistently finds that sizable numbers of
respondents feel ambivalent about democracy. In 2016, 23% believed regime type did
not matter and a further 15% felt that “under certain circumstances, authoritarian
government can be preferable to a democratic one.”
In countries facing the most intense problems with violent crime, dissatisfaction with
democracy is even more severe. In Brazil and the Northern Triangle countries, nearly
60% say they “wouldn't mind a non-democratic government in power if it could resolve
problems.” This data alone suggests how a figure like Bolsonaro was able to connect
with sizable numbers of Brazilian voters in the 2018 presidential campaign through
auhuthoritarian-style appeals and promises to meet national challenges with violence.
The military, in contrast, enjoys much higher rates of confidence. Despite the dark
histories of military rule, the military is often the most-trusted national institution in Latin
American countries. For example, 55% of Brazilians express “a lot ” or “some”
confidence in the military according to Latinobarómetro; in Mexico that number is nearly
60%. In Guatemala, the gap in public confidence is most striking. Support for the
military (44%) is nearly double that of the civilian police (24%). Latinobarómetro reveals
that citizens perceive civilian police and judiciaries to be corrupt and ineffective. The
public is thus increasingly demanding that the government look to the military to solve
major social problems.
No case better illustrates this pattern than Uruguay. The government reported a 66%
increase in homicides in the first half of 2018 from the same period the previous year,
with blame attributed to an increasingly active network of criminal groups. The
government plans to expand the budget for security operations, and in May it authorized
the military to engage in domestic policing operations on the border. So far, President
Tabaré Vázquez has resisted efforts to expand the jurisdiction of the military any further.
In May, he denied a request by the mayor of Lavalleja to deploy the military, proclaiming
that “Uruguay is not in a situation of war.”
Yet public pressure is mounting. In a recent poll, three out of four Uruguayans
support allowing the military to work with the police to combat crime. Nationalist senator
Jorge Larrañaga's “Live Without Fear” campaign gathered over 375,000 signatures to

force a plebiscite on a series of anti-crime measures, including one that would create a
new National Guard composed of military personnel that would work in conjunction with
police in an internal security role.
Militarization: A Bipartisan Consensus
As security challenges mount, the drive to use the military transcends conventional leftright political divisions. In El Salvador, both the right-wing Nationalist Republican
Alliance (ARENA) and left-wing Faribundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN)
governments have turned to the armed forces in the fight against crime and gang
violence. The 1992 peace accords, which ended El Salvador's civil war, mandated
police reform and an end to the use of the military in domestic policing operations. Yet
in 1995, the ARENA government empowered the armed forces with a renewed police
support role, especially in patrolling rural areas, through a presidential executive order.
By 2000, the military mission included Joint Task Groups with police in the counternarcotics fight.
When the left-wing FMLN won a majority in Congress for the first time in 2003, these
military practices continued. In September 2004, the government created the Anti-Gang
Task Force, which deployed military personnel to high crime areas. This deployment
grew from 333 military personnel in its first year to over 5,000 by 2009. The FMLN
presidencies of Mauricio Funes (2009-2014) and Salvador Sánchez Cerén (2014present) have continued these practices, renewing the executive decree each year that
allows military personnel to take on domestic policing duties. The capital of San
Salvador itself is now militarized, with the regular deployment of the military to conduct
policing operations.
Tellingly, the most effective policy aimed at reducing violence in the country was not
military activity but rather the temporary ceasefire between the two largest gangs in
March 2012, facilitated covertly by members of the government. While the truce held
over approximately the next 18 months, the murder rate dropped dramatically. After it
unraveled, the Funes administration unsuccessfully doubled down on military-based
strategies to reduce crime.
Mexico's experience similarly reveals a bipartisan consistency in the domestic use of
the armed forces. While the Mexican presidency saw transfers of power between the
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and the National Action Party (PAN) from 2000
until this year, the military has played a law enforcement role and has had internal
deployments, especially in Chiapas and Guerrero states in the 1990 s and more broadly
with the full militarization of the drug war in the 2000 s. Moreover, though Andrés
Manuel López Obrador of the MORENA party was seen as an outsider with the

potential to bring a new approach to the anti-drug fight, he looks set to continue using
the military in this manner.
Transfers of power in Honduras between the Liberal Party and the National Par ty
also demonstrate the entrenchment of domestic military missions. Honduras made
important strides in the late 1990s toward asserting civilian control over the armed
forces while simultaneously professionalizing and demilitarizing the national police. In
response to rising crime in the early 2000s, however, the military was deployed in a law
enforcement role and by 2002 “nearly half of all military personnel were assigned
continuously to joint patrols with police,” noted a 2003 U.S. State Department memo.
When President Manuel Zelaya came into office in 2006, these practices continued.
By 2013, four years after Zelaya was ousted in a parliamentary coup, the
government of Porfirio Lobo created the Military Police of the Public Order (PMOP),
whose operations must be formally approved by civilian officials but whose ranks are
filled by military personnel that answer to the military chain of command. PMOP
personnel have been implicated in numerous abuses, including arbitrary detention and
kidnapping.
Politicians like Evo Morales, the famed first Indigenous president of Bolivia, have
also used the military to break up protests, and it now takes part in border enforcement
alongside police. And while Ecuador has had a long succession of presidents of
different political tendencies from the 1990s to present, each one has maintained the
use of the armed forces for internal security. A 2014 constitutional amendment directly
empowered the military to “intervene in domestic security,” which further institutionalized
the military's internal role.
Mission Creep
While the general public supports deploying the military to combat other armed actors to
a large degree, doing so has had the unintended consequence of making the military
available as a tool for addressing non-security issues. The military is increasingly used
to advance the political and economic interests of the state and transnational
corporations, further undermining democracy itself. Across Latin America, the
criminalization of protest, enforced by the military, speaks to this problem. In
Guatemala, in October 2012, a joint police and military response to a protest against
increases in electricity costs left six people dead and another 34 wounded when
soldiers fired on the crowd in Totonicapán. In May 2018, military action stopped a
nationwide truckers' strike in Brazil.
The problem is especially acute when protests pose an obstacle to mining and other
extractive industries, where the military often provides security directly for corporations,
as Maiah Jaskoski has written. In late 2016, the Ecuadorian government deployed the

military to evict Indigenous Shuar from their ancestral homes to allow a Chinese mining
company to gain access. Protests and attacks against the military and police led the
government to declare a state of emergency in the province, granting the military more
authority to restore order. In Honduras, for over a year the community of Pajuiles
successfully blocked the Hidrocep company from entering the area to construct a
hydroelectric dam along the Mezapa River. In May 2018, however, the government
deployed the elite Tigres and Cobras special forces to the region to break up the
protests and allow machinery and company personnel to travel to the site and begin
work.
Other countries have gone further. Rather than calling in the military when situations
get out of control, they have tasked the military with regularly monitoring and protecting
important infrastructure and assets. Bolivia uses its military to protect natural gas
pipelines, and in neighboring Peru, the government declared the country's only oil
pipeline a “strategic asset” and now tasks the military with protecting it from vandals.
In a recent interview with Diálogo, the head of the Peruvian Army, General César
Augusto Astudillo Salcedo, sums up the trend well: “Not long ago, we only had one
mission, one main task, which was a conflict scenario on a battlefield … However, the
threats have changed now, and we went from having one mission to having 11.” These
missions include such non-traditional tasks as combatting illegal logging and
deforestation. Paraguay's military was deployed domestically in 2013 initially to combat
the rising threat of the Paraguayan People's Army, a Marxist guerrilla in surgency, but
its mandate now includes preventing cattle theft.
During the Cold War, in many cases militaries took up the fight against communist
“subversion” and embraced neoliberal economic development schemes that privileged
capital interests over public needs, of ten with the encouragement and support of the
United States. The use of the military today to displace people to make way for large
infrastructure projects and to suppress protests in favor of furthering the interests of
transnational corporations recalls the military-oligarch alliances of 20th century Central
America and the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes of the Southern Cone. Twentiethcentury militaries were key to upholding the highly concentrated landholding in Central
America, with military-run state parties substituting for genuine political competition and
militaries being used to enforce prohibitions on rural organizing. In the Southern Cone
dictatorships of the 1970s and 1980s, militaries similarly were central to the “coup
coalitions”—along with technocrats and capital interests—that overthrew civilian
governments and instituted military dictatorships committed to neoliberal economic
models, which especially sought to roll back workers' rights and to neutralize labor as a
political force. Seeing militaries take an overt economic role in today's Latin America is a
troubling echo of these past struggles.

As military missions themselves expand, armed forces are being granted sweeping
legal powers to operate with impunity. The Brazilian military, for example, has pushed
for more freedom to oversee its own operations as the government increasingly relies
on it to police urban areas. In late 2017, the Ministry of Defense publicly made the case
that allowing civilian courts to handle cases involving the military would hinder policing
operations. Its Congress subsequently passed Law No. 13.491, which gives military
courts jurisdiction over any of their personnel accused of human rights violations.
Colombia passed a similar bill in 2015, shifting jurisdiction for most crimes committed by
members of the military to military courts.
Allowing the armed forces to sit in judgment of its own cases can lead the military to
shield its personnel from accountability for alleged crimes. Military courts can mete out
more lenient punishment to its members, subverting justice and nurturing a culture of
impunity. With such systems in place, military personnel in the field act with less
restraint, knowing that they are unlikely to face accountability for abuses of power.
Fundamentally, military judgment of military actions is a conflict of interest that
contradicts the idea that no one can be their own judge, an essential principle of the rule
of law.
Even where civilian judicial oversight still exists, militaries are granted significant
leeway in how they carry out their operations. In El Salvador, for example, a 2015
directive authorized members of the military and police to shoot gang members if
threatened, without any legal consequences. Across the region, militaries now have
broad missions related to domestic security and operate with little oversight, leading to
increased human rights violations against civilians.
The Past and Future of Militarism in Latin America
While this growth in military power would be worrisome in any context, it is particularly
dangerous for Latin America given its troubled history of civil-military relations. The
military has traditionally been a major political player in the region, and by bestowing
renewed prestige and independence upon it, governments today are playing with fire.
The period since the end of the Cold War, which has fully subordinated military
officials to elected civilian officials, represents a hard-fought exception in Latin American
history. In the 19th and 20th centuries, militaries across the region followed an ethos of
loyalty to near-mythical patria (“fatherland”), seeing themselves as national guardians
who were above political leaders and would step in to reset political systems when they
deemed it necessary. For example, Ecuador's José Velasco Ibarra was elected to the
presidency no fewer than five times from the 1930s through the 1960s, but only
successfully served one complete term due to military interventions. Argentina's military

similarly clashed with populist leader Juan Perón, ultimately removing him from office in
1955 and outlawing the Peronist party for the next 18 years.
Moreover, the countries that faced widespread internal conflicts also experienced the
most volatile civil-military relations, because militaries came to blame the civilian
leadership for allowing domestic insurgencies to develop and fester. Far from unifying
against a common foe, internal threats divided civilian and military leaders. The intensity
of today's security challenges similarly endangers civil-military relations when militaries
use their enhanced visibility to publicly denounce civilian politicians. Brazilian Army
General Antonio Hamilton Mourão sparked controversy in September 2017 when he
suggested that military intervention in government might be necessary if corruption is
not brought under control. And in August 2018, in a high-profile speech on Dia do
Soldado (Soldier's Day), General Eduardo Villa Bôas condemned civilian politicians for
their ineffective leadership and complained that the military seemed to be the only
institution committed to solving the country's public security crisis. The fact that these
grievances are being aired publicly, as pointed criticisms of civilian government
performance, demonstrates the pressure democratically-elected leaders face to take
action and to deliver results, even if that pushes them to further empower the armed
forces.
Conflicts between civilian and military leadership in the contemporary era underscore
the challenges faced by young democracies with politically active militaries. No country
illustrates this danger more than Honduras. In 2009, after a prolonged crisis over a
proposed referendum for constitutional reform, the military removed President Zelaya
from office and sent him into exile in Costa Rica. The coup d’état demonstrated the
Honduran military's ability to decide the composition of government, placing it above the
democratic processes that put Zelaya or his congressional rivals in office. Furthermore,
in the aftermath of the coup, the interim government empowered the military to detain
citizens, which resulted in numerous cases of excessive force and arbitrary detention. In
subsequent years, state violence against citizens has increased, including the murder of
at least 18 activists, while impunity for these actions has reigned. Each election cycle
since the 2009 coup has seen significant protests, and the military has been employed
to counter them. Following the December 2017 election, widely believed to be
fraudulent, the Honduran military enforced a curfew and security forces killed at least 16
people in the following months.
A similar story of military political decision-making played out in Ecuador. The
irregular end to the presidencies of Abdalá Bucaram in 1997, Jamil Mahuad in 2000,
and Lucio Gutiérrez in 2005 all shared the common refrain that “the military withdrew its
support” for their tenure in office. For each president, in the face of street protests and
congressional opposition, the military rendered its judgment and sealed their fate.
Gutiérrez, who himself rose to prominence as a rebellious army officer in the 2000

Indigenous uprising that unseated Mahuad, saw that his presidency was at an end
when the head of the armed forces held a press conference withdrawing their support
for him.
The role of militaries as king-makers in Latin America should concern everyone, as it
directly contradicts the principles of popular sovereignty, the rule of law, and the hardfought gains of democratic consolidation in the region. If militaries ultimately hold the
destiny of governments in their hands, then electoral participation and competition mean
very little.
In Venezuela, the situation is at its most extreme. The military controls the fate of the
country. Both President Maduro and his opposition are aware of the importance of
whose side the military is on. In January 2019, Juan Guaidó, the head of the National
Assembly, declared the Maduro presidency constitutionally invalid and assumed the
role of leader of an interim government. Guaidó has called on the military to support his
claim to leadership and has reportedly held private talks with military officials to bring
them over to his side.
With economic conditions at an all-time low, military discontent is at an all-time high.
A foiled coup attempt in March 2018 was the most sophisticated so far, led by seven
generals who combined controlled over 60 percent of the country ’s military. The United
States has openly called for the military to oust President Nicolás Maduro and take
control. Maduro has responded by arresting and imprisoning hundreds of members of
the military on rebellion and other charges.
Rather than attempt to deter the military, however, Maduro has focused most of his
efforts on attempting to buy its loyalty. Active or retired members of the military run 10
government ministries, including the Ministry of Agricultural Production and Lands and
the Ministry of Electric Energy. The military controls a vast array of state and private
enterprises and nearly all of Venezuela's food distribution programs. In December 2017,
his administration put the military in charge of the state- owned oil company. In a large,
public ceremony in June 2018, Maduro promoted 16,900 soldiers for their “loyalty” to
the state.
Finally, the evolving crisis in Nicaragua likewise illustrates the expectation that the
armed forces will be the one to set the political course of the country. In the wake of
protests beginning in April 2018, the military has largely stayed out of the fray, holding
on to its apolitical image crafted since 1990. President Daniel Ortega has instead relied
on police and organized pro-government paramilitary groups to attack protesters and
suppress dissent. Political actors in the country, however, clearly see the military as
having a decision-making role, because in justifying its anti-interventionist stance, the
army has weighed in on the events, voicing a preference for dialogue between the
Ortega government and protesters. Most recently, the opposition has called on the
military to break its silence and to curtail the paramilitaries. The military's potential

intervention is an important part of each side's strategic calculations and suggests a
powerful political role for the institution.
Here to Stay
The military is back and here to stay. The institution benefits from a natural association
with patriotism, and many view it today as a last bastion of defense against criminals
who threaten the state. With corruption rampant and economies floundering, there is
widespread nostalgia for the days when the military was perceived to have maintained
order. Public support for the military will remain high so long as these societal problems
persist.
But as politicians and business leaders come to rely on the military to remain in
office and safely extract resources, they allow it to become a political actor again, with
frightening implications. Militaries will increasingly influence elections and crack down
on dissent to maintain their privileges. The region's history has demonstrated the
difficulty of taking power and influence away from the military once it has gained it. It
has most often taken a catastrophic event—defeat in an external war, economic crisis,
or revelations of large-scale human rights violations—to reassert civilian control.
The only hope of avoiding such a scenario is for civilian politicians to effectively
address violence, crime, and inequality through a democratic, public process, without
succumbing to corruption or militarized policies. Sustained efforts that lead to real
results could make the military less necessary and weaken public support for its
involvement in politics—a task easier said than done.
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